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well, really your [trafficker] is the only one on your side. It's really hard to
go to the police as safe people when you're being arrested by them.'
Jaime picks tomatoes in Northern Indiana farm fields. He was re-
cruited by a local agent in the rural environs of his small Guatemala vil-
lage. Captivated by promises of high hourly wages and legal entry and stay
status in the United States, he and his extended family pooled their money
together to pay the recruiter's fees. In Indiana, his passport has been se-
cured for safekeeping by the farm boss; he is required to perform back-
breaking field work for 14 or more hours a day, including weekends; is
incurring debts for his food and board; and has not been given a regular
accounting of either his hours worked or the extent of his debts. Jaime has
not left the farm since his arrival, except when accompanied by the supervi-
sor and the other workers on food shopping trips to the local supercenter.
Some state officials came by to inspect the filthy lodgings that were allo-
cated for the migrant workers' use. They interviewed Jaime and the other
workers in the presence of the bosses. Everyone said they were satisfied
and happy with their compensation and work conditions.2
Dolores, an undocumented Mexican immigrant whose husband had
paid for her to join him in Chicago, is trafficked into sexual slavery in Ari-
zona by her coyote. Her traffickers warn her that, if she escapes, the police
will send her back to Mexico. If she speaks to her "clients" about her true
situation, her parents' and siblings' location is known to her captors. She
only needs to "work off' her additional debt to them, and she will be re-
leased to join her husband in Chicago. After two months' confinement, Do-
lores escapes, but is picked up by the police. Unable to prove her identity or
that she has legal immigrant status, Dolores is detained and turned over to
Homeland Security. Dolores, not even sure of the location where she had
been held, does not speak of her experiences for fear that the traffickers will
harm her family in Mexico. She is deported to Mexico a few months after
her arrest. Her husband is saving up for a second attempt to have her join
him in Chicago. To local and federal law enforcement, and to officials with-
in the Department ofHomeland Security, Dolores was a criminal alien who
has broken the law and threatened U.S. border and national security.3
1. Tell Me More: Authorities: Superbowl Draws Pimps, Child Prostitutes (PBS
radio broadcast Feb. 2, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=133439415). This quote is from Jessi-
ca Richardson, who is a domestic trafficking victim.
2. Inspired by the narratives in Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery,
available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ClosetoSlavery.pdf.
3. Dolores is a hypothetical victim of human trafficking whose plight is never
recognized by the legal system. She is not identified as a victim, and her traffickers are never
caught or punished for their crimes against her. For discussion of a similar case. See Dina
Haynes, (Not) Found Chained in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to
Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337
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[In response to immigration, the United States has] obstructed minori-
ties from voting; required Latinos to present papers if the police ask for
them; opposed the Dream Act, which would have conferred citizenship on
young immigrants who served in our armed forces or went to college; and
called for denying the constitutional right to citizenship to American-born
children of undocumented immigrants.4
The excerpts and hypotheticals above demonstrate that the interaction
of legal status, societal perceptions, and the power conferred by legal doc-
trines and structures are integrally related to human trafficking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Focusing on human trafficking, this article is my first foray into ad-
dressing the role played by legal constructions of personhood in creating
the preconditions of exploitation of vulnerable groups and individuals. I
claim that the legal disabilities to which some human beings are sub-
jected-through exclusion of these groups and individuals from the soci-
ety's protections-create an inferior legal personality-a quasi-
personhood--that invites victimization such as human trafficking. And,
once an individual is subjected to that victimization, the imposition of legal
disabilities and the resulting quasi-personhood prevent and/or make diffi-
cult or impossible their escape from those situations.
A. HUMAN TRAFFICKING
In the last decades of the twentieth century, trafficking in human be-
ings, characterized as "modern day slavery," emerged fully as an issue of
global concern. According to the U.S. State Department's 2010 Trafficking
in Persons Report, more than 170 of the world's countries have a significant
trafficking problem and are countries of destination, origin, and/or transit.6
The trafficker in human beings controls the trafficked individual through
physical force or coercion, and/or the application of psychological forms of
(2006-07) (describing and analyzing the difficulties victims confront as law enforcement and
other sources of state authority fail to "recognize" them).
4. Harold Meyerson, The GOP's Anti-immigrant Stance Could Turn Texas into a
Blue State, THE WASH. POST, March 2, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030105589.html.
5. See TELL ME MORE, supra note 1.
6. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 47
(2010). Pursuant to Congressional mandate, the U.S. State Department produces an annual
report on human trafficking worldwide. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7112 (2000)) at §§
7106(e)(3)(A), (B).
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compulsion in order to extract services, and/or to trade the trafficked indi-
vidual, rather than through legal ownership .7 The trafficked human is
bought and sold, and services, i.e., sexual or other types of labor, are ex-
tracted from that human being with no compensation, or only token com-
8
pensation.
Trafficked humans are most often portrayed as women and children
who come from economically vulnerable countries and territories, are bur-
dened with more vulnerable socioeconomic statuses, and/or come from
disadvantaged regions, and/or groups within individual countries.9 In pre-
vious publications, I have urged analysis of the economic bases of human
trafficking and have advocated a market- and trade-based attack on the
trade.' 0 My research has led me to examine the ways in which legal struc-
tures and doctrines, such as the ways in which personhood is constructed
and stratified, contribute to the human-to-human exploitation of trafficking
in humans.
B. PERSONHOOD
The concept or term "person" is ubiquitous in the legal literature." It
is used to delineate the legal personality of actors within the society, i.e.,
7. Karen E. Bravo, Follow the Money? Does the International Fight Against Mon-
ey Laundering Provide a Model for International Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts?, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 138, 143 (2008).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: BETTER
DATA, STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS
ABROAD 12 (2006) (illustrative table comparing victim profiles shows that women and child-
ren constitute the majority of trafficking victims).
10. See, e.g., Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to Mod-
ern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545 (2009) [hereafter,
Free Labor].
11. For example, the term "person" is used in the definitions of "human trafficking"
adopted in each of the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the United Nations Traf-
ficking Protocol. The U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act defines sex trafficking as "the
purchase, sale, recruitment, harboring, transportation, transfer, or receipt of a person for the
purpose of a commercial sex act." Under the Act, "severe forms of trafficking" are defined
as:
A. sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced to perform such an act
has not attained 18 year of age; or
B. the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion
for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage, or slavery.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 7101 (emphasis added). The UN Trafficking Protocol
defines trafficking as
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their rights and obligations, and to further the policies and ideals of the state
and polity. Today, against a backdrop of legal recognition of international
human rights, 12 some humans are subjected to the assignment of a lesser or
quasi-personhood. The gap between the entities recognized as "persons"
and the rights recognized in and enforced on their behalf often contrasts
with the physical existence, basic needs, and legal rights of human beings. 3
In such cases, the society's and legal system's protective impulse becomes
transformed and hardened into the legal system's facilitation of exploita-
tion.14
While the concept of personhood is deployed and manipulated by
courts and legislatures to give and withhold rights to groups and individu-
als, there is little consistency in the use of the term.' 5 Who is a "person?"
How does the law construct this term? Are prisoners,16 ex-convicts, legal
immigrants, undocumented migrants, and/or trafficked individuals persons
or quasi-persons under contemporary law?
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a posi-
tion of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,
for the purpose of exploitation.
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Traf-
ficking Protocol], Art. 3 (emphasis added).
12. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been ratified by
all member states of the United Nations.
13. For example, corporate entities' Constitutional free speech rights include the
ability to spend to influence elections. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010). Humans who have been convicted of felonies may be forever deprived of the
right to vote in elections; see also Erwin Chemerinisky, The Constitution and Punishment,
2004 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (identifying and contrasting the inconsistencies in Supreme
Court jurisprudence with respect to the punishments (including the death penalty) imposed
on human individuals versus judicial resistance to the imposition of punitive damages that
may be asserted against corporate entities).
14. Free Labor, supra note 10, at 545, 586-87. For example, the immigrant is made
vulnerable through exclusion from the more privileged status of "citizen-national." See also
Kevin Johnson, "Aliens" and the US. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construc-
tion ofNonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263, 264-65 (1996-1997).
15. See, e.g., Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Lan-
guage of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REv., 1745, 1746 (2001) [hereafter, Talk About
Persons] ("[n]o coherent body of doctrine or jurisprudential theory exists regarding [person-
hood]").
16. See Tell Me More: Freed Prisoner Picks Up Journalism Award, Broadcast May
9, 2011, transcripts available at http://www.npr.org/2011/05/09/136139497/freed-prisoner-
picks-up-journalism-award (Walter Rideau describes the sexual enslavement and prostitution
of some prisoners by other prisoners, with the tacit approval of prison authorities).
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In Exploring the Analogy between Modern Trafficking in Humans and
the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, I stated that: "In the slave societies of the
era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the slave was a quasi-person, the
attributes of personhood serving the interests and profit-seeking of the slave
society."' 7 I further noted that:
In modem societies and states, crouched defensively
against the influx of would-be migrants, states have begun
to withhold the attributes of full personhood from those
who have either entered their borders illegally or, having
entered legally, have remained past the legally mandated
limit of their stay. [For example, t]he immigration laws
employed by the United States . . . serve to facilitate and
enforce enslavement and subjugation of economically vul-
nerable people. State immigration laws, and their domestic
and international enforcement, function in effect like the
"patterollers" and Black Codes of the American South.18
Personhood, despite various proposed definitions, is a concept that eli-
cits great debate, as there are diverse interpretations of the legal status, i.e.,
personhood, of various entities, including embryos and animals, 19 or the
rights and responsibilities of corporations and nations, as well as of the
attributes of human beings. As conceptualized in this article, the recognition
of personhood encompasses concepts of liberty, equal rights, autonomy,
and dignity, as expressed in individual societies through the protections
enshrined in legal instruments. The possessors of such attributes, who are
able to enforce the recognition of the full array of rights, are "persons."
Those who enjoy only a subset of those rights are quasi-persons or non-
persons within those societies.
The quasi-personhood crafted in prior eras has mutated to a more sub-
tle legal quasi-personhood, which enshrines racial, economic, and other
forms of subordination. While contemporary laws may prohibit de jure
enslavement and slavery, current legal doctrines and practices may facilitate
the defacto slavery-like exploitation,2 0 including trafficking, of vulnerable
groups and individuals. In the United States, for example, the legal person-
17. Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans
and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B. U. INT'L L.J. 207, 291 (2007).
18. Id. at 291-292 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 369, 387-92, 402-05 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Mass Incarceration ofAfrican-American
Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisement of Consti-
tutional Rights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 599 (2007) (arguing that the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system has re-enslaved African-American males).
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hood of immigrants, documented and undocumented, has been steadily
chipped away under immigration laws. 2 1 Legal mechanisms of subordina-
tion, among others, facilitate the international and domestic traffic in human
beings.
This article identifies and critically examines the role of the law in
constructing personhood, and the impact of such construction on the traf-
ficking of human beings. Part II discusses the concept of personhood gener-
ally, and the construction of the attributes of that personhood under U.S.
domestic law and international human rights law. Part III identifies and
examines some policy reasons for, and mechanisms utilized in, construct-
ing, recognizing, and/or enforcing attributes of personhood, as well as en-
hancements or limitations on that protection. Part IV analyzes the ways in
which quasi-personhood may result, so as to facilitate the exploitation, in-
cluding human trafficking, of certain groups and individuals. Part V con-
cludes that a holistic approach to and recognition of different mechanisms
and spheres of legal construction of personhood will more effectively pro-
tect such groups and individuals, and further the protective interests of the
society.
II. WHAT IS A PERSON?
You may be born a biological human being, but are you a person?
The law plays an integral role in creating, recognizing, and enforcing
personhood: whether through the enunciation of enforceable rights in do-
mestic and international instruments;22 through prohibitions on the exercise
of fundamental rights by identified groups and/or individuals; 23 through
subjection of certain groups to greater scrutiny by public officials;24 or
through recognition of legal personhood in artificial entities,2 5 the legal
system constructs legal personality within societies. The structures,
attributes, and disabilities imposed by the law on various groups and indi-
viduals interact with cultural, moral, ethical, and other forces in the society
to either strengthen or weaken the targeted entities' status.
21. See MEYERSON, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
22. See, e.g., the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States; U.S. CONST.
amend. 1-X.
23. For example, several states of the United States eliminate the right to vote of
either or both incarcerated and post-incarceration felons. See, e.g., JEFF MANZA &
CHRSTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OuT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 72-94 (2006).
24. For example, Arizona's 2010 anti-immigrant statute requires law enforcement
officials to subject individuals to added scrutiny (i.e., documentary proof of lawful presence)
if law enforcement officers reasonably believe that the individuals may not be lawfully
present in the United States.
25. See infra Part III.B.5 for discussion of corporate entities.
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This article assumes that personhood should facilitate all beneficial ac-
tivities and potential of the human being - the full flourishing of the human
individual. The analysis conducted herein does not attempt to give a defini-
tive answer to the question of the inherence and/or pre-existence of person-
hood: that is, whether personhood exists apart from the law, such that the
law merely encapsulates,26 in words and enforcement mechanisms the prior
existence of certain rights and attributes of different entities; 2 7 or whether
the law creates such rights and attributes, to which cultural, economic, and
political forces then add further layers of meaning. Instead, this article takes
the position that the law plays an interactive role, shaping the contours of
personhood while itself shaping and being shaped by forces within individ-
ual societies and across transnational communities.
A. INTRODUCTION
What qualities are essential to personhood? Who or what is a person?
There is no universal definition of "person" or "personhood."28 Indeed, in
legal discourse and instruments, the term is not always used even as
attributes of personhood are granted or withheld. As used in this article,
personhood, and the status of person, means the legal recognition of the
rights, duties, and obligations (including, for example, human rights and
civil rights) that enable access to the full range of human potential of indi-
viduals and groups in a given society. Recognition (or non-recognition) and
enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of such rights by the legal system
interact with economic, social, cultural, and political forces such that it is
not solely the legal personality of affected groups and individuals that is
26. That is, re-stating the already recognized.
27. Such as the rights of human beings under a natural law theory. See, e.g., Mi-
chael Boylan, Are There Natural Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2011 (discussing
various theories of the origins, existence, and contours of human rights).
28. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human
Rights, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 209, 213 (2005) ("Descartes famously conceived the notion of
persons as the union of body and soul, and fundamentally, the union of two kinds of sub-
stance: res extensa and res cogitans. This union distinguished persons from mere animals
(machines lacking souls) .... [John] Locke too thought of a person as a "thinking intelligent
being"). That is, potential answers vary, depending on the area of study, the era, and the
philosophical inclinations of the respondent. Others have described a person in the naturalis-
tic view of one that is born, and accordingly "persons are simply biological organisms of
sufficient complexity that we can attribute psychological as well as physical characteristics
to them." Id. at 214. This may beg the question of whether a cat who desires a saucer of milk
would fit under this definition. Ohlin himself advocates a "cluster concept" of personhood.
Id. at 229-33.
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shaped and constructed; those factors also affect their capacity to function
as equals within a society.29
The difficulties of defining the term reflect the swirling intermixture of
the following questions, among others: Are, and should, all human beings
be persons? I.e., should personhood and humanity overlap completely? And
how should juridical-i.e., artificial-persons be distinguished from human
persons? Should they be? Should personhood be constructed to promote
equality of status and access within individual societies (and across transna-
tional communities)? And what does that mean: That is, how does equality
operate, and how is it implemented? Does it signify a right to all the tools
and benefits of the law?
I acknowledge the intense difficulty (or impossibility!) of defining or
attempting to constrain the content and significance of the personhood con-
cept or term. Indeed, according to legal scholar, Jens David Ohlin, "[e]ven
within philosophy, personhood does not have a settled meaning but is the
site of intense metaphysical disagreement."0 o The intensity of the difficulty
is centered in the multi-varied use of the term, and its grounding across
different fields, areas of study, and philosophies,3 1 as well as its use as part
of, and the understanding of the concept in, everyday life. According to
Ohlin:
In our daily lives, when we have no difficulty picking out
persons from nonpersons, the individual components of the
cluster [of personhoodi are consistent with each other, i.e.,
there is no conflict between them. But . . . legal controver-
sies . . . demonstrate that the law is rife with cases where
32
the components of the cluster pull in opposite directions.
However, I might demand more clarity from Ohlin's characterization
above. In everyday life, it is easy to recognize the existence and/or presence
of a biological human being, but it may be impossible, without further in-
vestigation, to ascertain that biological human's legal non-personhood or
29. JOEL M. CHARON, SYMBOLIc INTERACTIONISM: AN INTRODUCTION, AN
INTERPRETATION, AN INTEGRATION, 156-163, 218-20 (Prentice-Hall, 5th ed. 1995) (describ-
ing the interactive formation of individual identity within social contexts). Charon demon-
strates that the individual does not stand alone - societal perceptions and transmission of
those perceptions contributes to and, indeed, shapes the identity. Id. at 163. Similarly, law
shapes and legally defines the identity of individuals and groups within and across societies.
The law may demand subordination and/or may give permission to exploit.
30. Ohlin, supra note 28, at 213.
31. Id. at 214 ("The meaning of the term is so difficult to nail down because it
straddles not only metaphysics, biology, and religion, but also value theory, such as moral
philosophy and the law.").
32. Id. at 230.
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quasi-personhood in particular contexts. That is, while the biological human
may exist, his/her rights may have been withdrawn or temporarily withheld
by operation of law, so that s/he may be unable to assert and/or enforce the
society's recognition of his/her existence or right to participate in the socie-
ty. The withdrawal of the right to participate may include deeply fundamen-
tal rights and functions enjoyed by other, more privileged members of that
33society.
In the absence of the ability or the time to investigate the legal status
of all individuals encountered in quotidian social and other interactions,
short cuts become useful, and thus the norm, such that age, race, gender,
and/or perceived socio-economic status are used as proxies for the determi-
nation of the personhood, quasi-personhood or non-personhood of biologi-
cal human individuals.
Despite the difficulties of definition, the concept of personhood con-
tinues to be used and useful because "[it] is a talisman that confers status,
respect, and moral worth, and for this reason the concept is deeply in-
grained in legal discourse in general and in human rights in particular."3 4 As
Ohlin observes, "[r]ights are usually ascribed to human beings or persons
because these categories are valid bearers of moral interests; indeed, this
pattern of reasoning is frequently invoked in domestic case law, the scholar-
ly literature on rights, and international instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."35
B. PERSONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Beginning from the understanding that human beings are the most eas-
ily recognizable "persons," and are, perhaps, the "first" or "quintessential
persons,"36 I explore here some fundamental rights recognized in humans
beings pursuant to international instruments and international law.
Most scholars assume that, whatever is meant by "personhood," it is a
pre-requisite for making a human rights claim.3 7 The broad sweep of inter-
national human rights is enshrined in the United Nations' December 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The core principles which the
33. See discussion Part III infra. Examples include the withholding of post-
incarceration voting rights from ex-convicts, even though they have paid their debts to socie-
ty.
34. Ohlin, supra note 28, at 211.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Talk About Persons, supra note 15, at 1745 (discussing "the common-
place understanding of what it means to be a person - that all humans are persons and all
persons are humans").
37. Ohlin, supra note 28, at 212.
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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Declaration promotes include universality, equality and non-discrimination,
and the notion that human rights simultaneously entail both rights and
obligations from duty bearers and rights holders. 39 Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies the basis for claiming the
rights. It states: "All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience . . . ."40
The use of the words "all humans" is repeated throughout the rest of
the Declaration or used interchangeably with words like "everyone" or "no
one." 41 "Humanity" thus provides the contours of the basic assumption of
the Declaration about the right to liberty and equality as the birthright of
human beings that cannot be alienated. Further, because humans are ration-
al and moral beings, that thinking, moralizing, philosophizing biological
entity is different from other creatures on earth and therefore entitled to
certain rights and freedoms which other creatures may not enjoy.
In Article 6, the Declaration provides that "Everyone has the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law."4 2 The Declaration's
39. Id. The Declaration therefore is a unit of measurement by which to measure the
degree of respect for, and compliance with, international human rights standards worldwide.
The Declaration provides for the right to Freedom from Discrimination; Right to Life, Liber-
ty, Personal Security; Freedom from Slavery; Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treat-
ment; Right to Equality before the Law; Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal; Freedom
from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile; Right to Fair Public Hearing; Right to be Considered Inno-
cent until Proven Guilty; Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family, Home and Cor-
respondence; Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country; Right to Asylum in other
Countries from Persecution; Right to a Nationality and the Freedom to Change It; Right to
Marriage and Family; Right to Own Property; Freedom of Belief and Religion; Freedom of
Opinion and Information; Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association; and the Right to
Participate in Government and in Free Elections. The rights listed above, enshrined in the
Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are referred to as the first generation of human
rights. Id., passim.
40. Id., Article 1. These concepts have been reiterated in numerous international
human rights conventions, declarations, and resolutions, as other core treaties or conventions
have their foundation in the Universal Declaration. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights preamble, Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 U.N.T.S. 172:
The States Parties to the present Covenant, Considering that, in accor-
dance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Na-
tions, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world, Recognizing that these rights derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person.
Id.
41. See, e.g., Articles 4 through 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(using the language of "everyone" and "no one").
42. U.N. G.A. Res. 217, supra note 25 (emphasis added). This language is restated
verbatim in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 16, Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 U.N.T.S. 177.
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invocation of the right to legal personhood for all humans indicates the
integral role played by the law in preserving and enforcing the rights expli-
citly formulated in the other provisions of the Declaration. However, the
Declaration defines "person" under international human rights law only
through a reading of the various articles, and through tracing the words
used in the Preamble and the first Article of the Declaration. Based on such
a reading, it is clear that the "person" being referred to in the instrument is a
human being.
C. PERSONS UNDER U.S. DOMESTIC LAW
The malleability of the concept of personhood in U.S. domestic law
has been evident since the founding of the republic. Both the terms "per-
son" (referring to individuals) and "people" (the collectivity of the Ameri-
can people, i.e., citizens) are used throughout the U.S. Constitution to refer
to human beings.4 3 However, the term is disaggregated and fractionated in
different provisions of the instrument so that it is used to refer to any indi-
vidual human being, as well as to slaves, aliens, and voting men.
1. Constitutional Persons
For reasons of political expedience to create the union, using the lan-
guage of "persons" as a synonym for "slave," in the Apportionment Clause,
the Framers distinguished between full and two-thirds persons (enslaved
Africans);" in the Slave Trade Clause protected the right to continue to
import enslaved Africans until 1808;45 and in the Fugitive Slave Clause
46ordered the return of fugitive enslaved blacks to their owners.
43. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People . . . establish this Constitution.") The
word People in the Constitution originally meant collectively the free landowning citizens
with the right to vote. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 171 (2000). At the writing of
the Constitution these people were only white men, not free blacks or white women. Howev-
er, through later amendments the people came to mean collectively all citizens. See infra
Part II.C.I.
44. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their re-
spective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id. (emphasis added).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, Cl. 1.
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con-
gress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax
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The U.S. Constitution was rescued from the twilight of the Great
Compromise 4 7 by the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment, which proc-
laimed all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof to be citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. According to legal scholar, Akhil Amar:
The [14th] amendment aimed to provide an unimpeachable
legal foundation for the earlier statute, making clear that
everyone born under the American flag-black or white,
rich or poor, male or female, Jew or Gentile-was a free
and equal citizen . . .. The amendment also made clear that
non-native, naturalized Americans were entitled to claim
the privileges of citizenship . . . . [A] state would no longer
enjoy carte blanche to designate some (that is, whites) as
"citizens" and to treat others (free blacks) as lesser "inhabi-
tants.A8
Amar further claims that:
By incorporating the rights of the Fifth Amendment, the
privileges-or-immunities clause, under the precedent of
Dred Scott, would have prevented states from depriving
"citizens" of due process. [The writers of the 14th amend-
ment] wanted to go even further by extending the benefits
of state due process to aliens.49
This is the reason that "persons" is used in this clause instead of "citi-
zens."50 It was considered essential that all present within the United States,
or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for each Person.
Id. (emphasis added).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the laws the-
reof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regula-
tion therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be de-
livered up on Claim of the party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. See Derrick Bell, Prologue: The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction,
THE DERRICK BELL READER 17-22 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancik eds., 2005). See also
Paul Finkelman, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 3-36 (2001) (discussing the debate about slavery and the slave trade at the Consti-
tutional Convention and the resulting "dirty compromise").
48. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CoNsTITuTIoN 381 (2006).
49. AKHiL REED AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS 172 (2000).
50. Id
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whether citizens or strangers, should have equal protection in every state
within the United States in the rights of life and liberty and property.51 The
expansion of the Constitution-based recognition and enforcement of per-
sonhood in a broader group of human beings is reflected in the Bill of
Rights and in our understanding of it. While the original Bill of Rights fo-
cused primarily on empowering the people collectively against government
agents following their own agenda,5 2 "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, by
contrast, focused on protecting minorities against even responsive, repre-
sentative, majoritarian government."5 3 According to Amar, "[t]he comple-
mentary phrase in the 1866 amendment-'privileges or immunities of citi-
zens'-indicates a subtle but real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision more
liberal than republican, more individualist than collectivist, more private
than public, more negative than positive."5 4 The privileges-or-immunities
clause spoke of all citizens including women and children.s This is made
clear by the phrase "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." 5 6
The Fourteenth Amendment appeared to transform the Constitution's
recognition of legal personhood from the fractionated and racist to a more
holistic, natural rights recognition of legal personhood based on the exis-
tence of the human being. However, since the U.S. Constitution retained
distinctions based on membership in and belonging to the national commu-
nity (i.e., citizenship), the domestic legal system maintained the malleabili-
ty of the concept and its capacity to permit exploitation.
In light of the domestic and international recognition of the rights of
"persons," when, why and how does the law operate so as to construct a
quasi- or subordinated status with respect to fundamental aspects of exis-
tence and participation in human society?
51. Id. at 172-74. And, in 1982, in Plyler v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed
the personhood of human beings under the U.S. Constitution, no matter their immigration
status. 457 U.S. 202, 213-15 (1982).
52. The original bill of rights uses the words "the rights" and "the powers" of "the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. These phrases conjure up civic republicanism, collective
political action, public rights, and positive liberty. AKHIL REED AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS 215-
16(2000).
53. Id. at 215.
54. Id. at 216.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV).
57. See discussion Part III infra.
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III. MAKING AND UNMAKING LEGAL PERSONS
A. THE POWER OF THE LAW
This Part of the article seeks to depict and analyze the power of the
law: why and how does it construct personhood? How does the power and
authority of that construction interact with the cultural, political, and eco-
nomic forces within individual societies to construct "persons"? Does law
increase vulnerability? Why and how? What is the tipping point from the
protective impulse to the vindictive result? When and how is the protective
purpose used as a mask for more inimical intentions?
The term or concept of "person" is used expansively to defend certain
prohibitions central to the legal system. Thus, the murder of any biological
human being (including, in some states, viable fetuses) violates criminal
laws. In the conferral of benefits, such as entitlements, or the recognition
and enforcement of human or civil rights, however, the term "person" may
be narrowly construed so as to exclude unwelcome or disfavored groups
and/or to constrain certain behaviors.
B. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGIES
The construction and stratification of personhood within societies is
not new, nor does that stratification always originate from malevolent in-
tent. For example, different types and hierarchies of personhood may be
constructed in order to protect the society and/or to protect individuals and
groups who are viewed as vulnerable to exploitation. Under domestic U.S.
law, the methodologies utilized to give and withhold rights that form legal
personhood include: (a) Constitutional distinctions such as the use of differ-
ent terms in the clauses of the Constitution, so that, for example, only citi-
zens are eligible for certain rights;59 and (b) Federal legislation and regula-
tions that impose restrictions on certain groups;6 0 (c) State legislation and
61regulations that impose their own restrictions on individuals or groups.
58. For example, under Indiana law, "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally
terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to re-
move a dead fetus commits feticide, a Class B felony." IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2010). This
section does not apply to lawful abortions. Id.
59. For example, Article II restricts eligibility for some federal offices to native-
born citizens, but all persons within United States territory have rights, for example, due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 171-72.
60. Examples include statutory prohibitions on access to federal housing by ex-
felons, particularly drug offenders. Gwen Rubenstein and Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and
Housing-Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
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Some examples of protective and punitive objectives, and the metho-
dologies deployed to affect them, are described and analyzed below.
1. Protection of certain groups
Minors and incompetents in need of additional state protection may be
foreclosed, through the application of contract validity laws, from incurring
some obligations. 62 However, contract validity and other disabilities im-
posed on minors may be eliminated through a successful petition for re-
moval of the disabilities of minority.6 3 Further, the protection of this "vul-
nerable" group may be removed where a minor has transgressed the crimi-
nal law. 4 In that case, the punitive power of the law and its categorization
of that law-breaking individual may change such that the transgressing mi-
nor is permanently removed from society through lifetime incarceration or
permanent erasure (the death penalty).65
The criminalization of prostituted minors, the victims of commercial
sexual exploitation, exemplifies society's ambivalence toward minors who
are perceived to be transgressors of its rules. Although the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act has been enforced at the federal level and many states
have enacted their own anti-trafficking legislation, 6 6 the anti-trafficking
policies have been slow to take hold at state and local levels at a time when
soaring child poverty rates are increasing the involvement of girls in com-
mercial sexual exploitation.6 7 For example, B.W., a thirteen-year-old girl
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, 43-46 (Marc Mauer and Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2003).
61. They include the housing restrictions that mirror and or exceed the severity of
federal laws, as well as the withholding of voting rights from ex-felons. Jeremy Travis,
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 21-22 (Marc Mauer and Meda
Chesney-Lind eds. 2003).
62. For example, under Indiana law, contracts with a minor or incompetent may be
voided. See, e.g., 6 IND. LAw ENCYC. CONTRACTS § 32 (referring to mental condition or age
of party).
63. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-34-20-6 (2011) (Emancipation of Child; findings;
terms).
64. For example, minors who commit certain crimes are transferred from the juve-
nile system and charged and punished as adults.
65. Note, however, that the Supreme Court's opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) held unconstitutional the execution of individuals who are minors at the
time of the homicide, thus eliminating this option from the law's arsenal.
66. See discussion, notes 141-147 and accompanying text infra.
67. Carrie Baker, Jailing Girls for Men's Crimes, MS MAGAZINE (Dec. 8, 2010)
(providing that "the FBI's Innocence Lost National Initiative has removed more than 1,000
children from prostitution and convicted more than 570 pimps since 2003"). See also Wil-
liam Adams et al., Effects of Federal Legislation on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of
Vol. 31482
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with a history of sexual and physical abuse who had been living with a thir-
ty-two year old man, was convicted of prostitution after offering to perform
a sex act for an undercover officer in return for twenty dollars. The child
was charged and convicted, despite the fact that, under Texas law, she was
considered incapable of consenting to sex because she was under the age of
fourteen. The Texas Supreme Court later reversed the conviction, stating
that, "Children are the victims, not the perpetrators, of child prostitution."69
The court further noted that "[t]he decision to prosecute these [children]
rather than provide a safe harbor only makes them more vulnerable, and
more numerous." 70
The range of legal treatment of minors-from protection to ulti-
mate/terminal punishment-reflects philosophical and societal ambivalence
about the personhood of minors and about the point at which they become
full thinking beings (and, perhaps, persons?). It also demonstrates, once
more, the malleability of the legal personhood of entities and groups per-
ceived as most vulnerable.7 1
2. Protection of the Society and Punishment of the Lawbreaker
Ex-convicts from whom society believes it must be protected find their
post-conviction and post-incarceration rights, such as the right to vote and
to bear arms, for example, have been curtailed.72 As voting rights in the
United States are state-based, instead of being centered in the federal Con-
Children, Juvenile Justice Bulletin (July 2010) (noting that an estimated 300,000 children
may be subjected to commercial sexual exploitation each year).
68. Baker, supra note 67, at 27.
69. Id at 31.
70. Id at 28. In the midst of a national debate over whether underage girls selling
sex should be prosecuted for prostitution, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, and Washington
have enacted laws providing that prostituted girls are not criminals, but are victims of sexual
trafficking instead. Id. at 27. Similar legislation is underway in Florida, California, Minneso-
ta, Texas, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 31. However, conservative religious groups
successfully defeated a similar provision in Georgia. Id. at 28.
71. See supra introductory paragraph to Part II.C.
72. Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 51-52 (Marc
Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2003). See also Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Inter-
nal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 153, 153 (1999):
[U]pon release from prison or discharge from non-incarcerative sen-
tences, many ex-offenders find themselves internally exiled. They are
saddled with restrictions that exclude them from major aspects of socie-
ty. An increasing number of mandatory exclusions from the labor force
and governmental programs have followed a temporary decrease of
some collateral consequences during the 1960s and early 1970s.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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stitution, loss of such rights bars an individual's electoral participation in
the municipal, state and federal elections-a form of civic death." Racist
felon disenfranchisement laws were introduced in the Southern states in the
post-Reconstruction era, and spread throughout the country. 74 The contin-
ued effectiveness of those laws in maintaining the subordination and elimi-
nating the civic participation of black citizens increased their attractiveness
and probably contributed to their staying power.7 ' For example, in the state
of Florida, during the 2000 Presidential Elections, the laws were instrumen-
tal in foreclosing the participation of a significant number of black voters.76
The post-incarceration penalties extend to entitlement programs that
would facilitate the re-integration of ex-convicts into the society. For ex-
ample, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.77 The legislation replaced individ-
ual welfare entitlements with block grants to states called Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families (TANF). 7 8 PRWORA provides that "[a]nyone
convicted of a federal or state felony . . . that involved the possession, use,
or distribution of drugs is not eligible to receive food stamps or [TANF],
and the amount payable to any family or household of which such a person
is a member is reduced proportionately." 79 Notably, this is a lifetime ban.80
The penalties also extend to the ability to afford housing following re-
lease from prison. Federal housing laws permit public housing authorities to
exclude applicants for public housing or housing assistance who have prior
73. See Manza and Uggen, supra note 23, at 13 ("The U.S. Constitution vests the
states with the right to decide who can vote, and except for the explicit constitutional excep-
tions, states are free to decide which criteria they want to use.")
74. See Elizabeth A. Hull, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons 18-23 (2006).
75. See id. at 11, 20-21, 23-27.
76. Id. at 134-37 (describing the removal of many Blacks from the Florida voter
lists).
77. Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of Bene-
fits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, 40 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002).
78. Id. at 40-41.
79. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES
IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION 10 (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/collateralconsequences.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL STATUTES].
80. Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences
of Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 299, 309 (2005). States may, however, elect not to impose the ban or to limit it tempo-
rally. 21 U.S.C. § 862A(D). Eight states and the District of Columbia have completely opted
out of the ban. Id., at 309. Twenty states have modified the ban, while twenty-two have
adopted it in its entirety. Id Significantly, PWORA's prohibition only reaches drug offenses,
reflecting the War on Drugs mentality of the 1990s. Therefore, an individual convicted of
murder or child molestation remains eligible for TANF and food stamps, while a person
convicted of possession of marijuana faces the possibility of a lifetime ban. Rubinstein &
Mukamel, supra note 77, at 41.
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criminal convictions, particularly those applicants who had been convicted
of drug-related offenses.8 'Moreover, certain types of offenders face lifetime
bans from federally assisted housing.82
Other federal laws indirectly impede ex-convicts' efforts to obtain em-
ployment.83 For example, one federal statute denies certain federal funds
from states that do not automatically revoke drug offenders' driver's li-
censes for six months. 84 Additionally, there are legal restrictions on em-
ployment opportunities for ex-convicts at both the federal and state levels.85
Further, Federal law prohibits felons from securing certain kinds of em-
ployment, including a permanent inability to enlist in any branch of the
armed forces (unless an exception is made).8 6 As summarized by law pro-
fessor Nora Demleitner:
Increasingly, regulatory and administrative decisions deny-
ing governmental benefits also substantially impact the ex-
offender's family by restricting her employment opportuni-
ties and participation in governmental programs. Moreover,
the rise in the rate of individuals with criminal records has
caused a growing number of ex-offenders and their families
to experience this de facto punishment.87
81. Finzen, supra note 80, at 312-13. Additionally, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development has adopted a "One Strike and You're Out" policy for criminal and
drug-related activity. Id., at 313-14. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has rejected
the "innocent owner" defense, meaning that a lessee can be evicted even if he or she had no
knowledge of the criminal activities of another household member or guest. Id. at 313 (citing
Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002)). Further, the applicants'
right to privacy is curtailed: public housing authorities may require applicants to disclose
their drug treatment records. Id. at 313.
82. For example, individuals convicted of manufacturing or producing methamphe-
tamine on the premises of federally assisted housing may be evicted and permanently barred
from federal low-income housing. FEDERAL STATUTES, supra note 79, at 10. Similarly, indi-
viduals facing lifetime state sex-convict registration requirements are permanently barred
from federally assisted housing. Id.
83. Finzen, supra note 80, at 315-16.
84. Id. at 316. This law narrows the employment options available to ex-convicts by
removing jobs that involve driving from the menu of potential employment options, and also
makes it more difficult for ex-convicts to get to work. Id. Ex-convicts face many barriers to
obtaining employment upon their release from prison. Many employers are reluctant to hire
individuals with criminal backgrounds, and technological advances have made it increasing-
ly easy and inexpensive to conduct criminal background investigations prior to making
hiring decisions. Id. at 315.
85. FEDERAL STATUTES, supra note 79, at 315.
86. Id.
87. Demleitner, supra note 72, at 153.
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The disabilities and constraints on participation in multiple spheres of
society do not come solely from the federal government. In addition to the
provisions in federal law that require states to bolster (and thus multiply)
the effects of the punitive federal post-incarceration provisions, numerous
state laws also limit ex-convicts' employment options. These statutes vary
widely from state to state.89 One of the most common ways in which states
restrict employment opportunities is by limiting the availability of profes-
sional licenses to ex-convicts.90 In many instances, licensing laws may ex-
pressly prohibit ex-convicts from engaging in an occupation. 9 1
The consequences for the ex-convict are quite draconian. The ability to
participate in and be a part of society -- the ability to live, to work, to be a
citizen (expressed through voting), i.e., the "legal personhood" of the indi-
vidual becomes quite constrained.9 2 According to Professor Nora Demleitn-
er:
Ex-offenders remain banished from mainstream society.
Even upon expiration of the maximum sentence, collateral
sentencing consequences continue to remove the ex-
offender from society-at least figuratively--by bestowing
outlaw status upon her and preventing her from regaining
full membership rights. 'Our actual practice is to permit
almost all criminals to return to society, in a physical sense,
but to hold them off, make them keep their distance, segre-
gate them in the midst of the ordinary community.' By re-
legating the ex-offender to internal exile, existing restric-
tions on the rights of ex-offenders come into conflict with
international human rights norms that have abolished ba-
nishment and exile as punishment for citizens. 93
88. Finzen, supra note 80, at 313.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Additionally, licensing laws may indirectly prohibit ex-convicts from engag-
ing in certain types of employment by requiring individuals seeking occupational licenses to
have good moral character and using past criminal history as evidence of bad moral charac-
ter. Id. Quite often, state licensing statutes bar all ex-convicts from employment in the li-
censed occupation, regardless of whether the past offenses are at all related to the type of
employment sought. Id. Thus, individuals with past drug convictions may be barred from
working as septic tank cleaners and those with past convictions for burglary may be denied
the licensure necessary to become embalmers. Id.
92. Demleitner, supra note 72, at 159-60 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 159-60. Professor Demleitner's concludes that: "Outlaw status amounts
not only to a denial of full citizenship but also to a violation of the ex-offenders' human
rights." Id.
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The punitive impact is intentional. Professor Demleitner asserts that:
"Some members of Congress, for example, have indicated in floor debates
that criminal offenders are either lesser human beings or not human at
all."94
3. Protection of the Nation State from the "Other"
In order to protect the nation-state from the participation of the non-
citizen, the rights of that group-including rights of participation and so-
95cietal protections-are limited. Immigrants have never enjoyed the same
rights as citizens under domestic U.S. law. 96 However, the immigration
reforms and non-reforms of most recent decades have succeeded in further
shrinking those already limited rights.97 As in trans-Atlantic slavery,98 the
legal personhood of these individuals and groups is a fraction of the per-
sonhood of the citizen or permanent resident. As a result, non-citizens do
not enjoy the full range of rights that inhere in the citizen, and even pre-
viously recognized Constitutional protections may be withdrawn.99 The
limitations apply both to permanent residents'00 who are non-citizens law-
fully present in the United States and to undocumented immigrants.
The effect of such disabilities is the creation of stratified personhood
that enshrines inequality. According to law professor Owen Fiss:
The subjugation produced by the laws imposing social dis-
abilities on immigrants is, however, of another character,
for what is entailed is not simply drawing a distinction
among people, but rather creating a different kind of social
94. Id. at 160 (quoting EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINOLOGY (5th ed. 1955)).
95. See Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, BOSTON REVIEW (October/November
1998), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR23.5/Fiss.html ("The political disabilities rest
on the idea that the nation is a community, not just a geographic bounded territory, and like
any such voluntary organization requires rules of membership and vests the power of gover-
nance in those lawfully admitted to membership.").
96. (For example, non-citizens in the United States do not have the right to vote.)
97. E.g., Title V of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C (Sept. 30, 1996) and Title IV of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996) restricted or removed non-citizen eligibility for the vast majority
of federal public benefits. These include housing assistance and food assistance. This strin-
gent re-writing of law applies to both documented and undocumented immigrants.
98. See Bravo, supra note 17, at 269 -74, 291.
99. Johnson, supra note 14, at 275.
100. "Permanent residents are non-citizens who have been granted permission to stay
in the country, access to the labor market, some civil rights, limited welfare rights, and yet
more restricted political rights." Demleitner, supra note 72, at 165 n.44.
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structure altogether: it entails a further stratification or de-
gradation of the very poor, or in Justice Brennan's words,
'raises the specter of a permanent caste.' . . . These laws
further isolate poor immigrants from the dominant groups
in society and make them vulnerable in a way that is not
true of laws that privilege intelligence or wealth.' 0 '
4. Protection of the Native Worker and of the Economy
In order to protect the native- (or citizen-) worker and the economy,
legal disabilities are imposed on both the "uninvited," "illegal" migrant
worker and the lawfully present guestworker.10 2 These disabilities are even
more severe than those imposed on the lawfully present non-citizen.10 3
The sources of such restrictions stem from federal, state, and munici-
pal authorities. In addition to the threat of deportation and other disabilities
under federal law, states and municipalities are the source of additional
constraints on the illegal migrant worker. Since 2006, state laws and local
ordinances concerning immigration-related issues have proliferated. This
floodtide of legislation is justified under a theory that illegal immigration
undermines the sovereignty of the United States, poses a threat to national
security, raises crime rates, steals jobs, and financially burdens the states,
which, due to federal inaction, are forced to deal with the consequences of
illegal immigration through their traditionally recognized police powers.
The most recent wave of anti-immigrant ordinances on the local level
began with a ballot measure in San Bernardino, California in 2006. The
measure unsuccessfully sought to (a) deny city money and permits to busi-
nesses that employ undocumented immigrants, (b) allow local police to
seize the automobiles used to pick up day laborers, (c) prohibit the ability of
undocumented immigrants to rent property, and (d) require that all city
business take place only in the English language.10 4 Although immigrants'
rights and civil rights advocates defeated the bill, similar proposals began to
emerge throughout the country.
101. Fiss, supra note 95 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 213). In Plyler, the Su-
preme Court confirmed the personhood of undocumented immigrants under the Constitution
of the United States.
102. See generally Close to Slavery, supra note 2; and notes 137-140 and accompa-
nying text infra.
103. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 284-86.
104. Proliferation of Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinances in the United States Before
Jorge Bustamante, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
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Within the first year after the San Bernardino proposal, ninety local
governments proposed more than a hundred ordinances similar to the mod-
el.105 In addition, immigration was the subject of at least 540 bills in twen-
ty-seven states in 2006.106 Anti-immigration measures continue to be intro-
duced throughout the country: In April 2010, Arizona passed a far-reaching
anti-immigration measure, SB 1070, which would have required, among
other things, that state and local law enforcement ascertain the immigration
status of individuals who they suspect are undocumented immigrants, and
detain those unable to substantiate the legality of their status. o0 Several
states have followed Arizona's lead. For example, Indiana's legislature
adopted Senate Bill 590, which is remarkably similar to the disputed Arizo-
na legislation;108 and an Illinois legislator recently proposed an Arizona-
style bill, HB 1969.109
The rise in state general immigration legislation reflects the frustration
of many state and local lawmakers with inaction from the federal legislative
branch in Washington. 1 o Curiously, Republicans, who control the House of
Representatives, do not support an overhaul of immigration laws, which
President Obama has promised to continue to support,"' even while Repub-
lican state legislative counterparts spearhead the majority of state-level anti-
immigrant legislation.'
105. Id.
106. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1557, 1558 (2008).
107. See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010. Following a challenge by the federal government, implementation of
parts of the legislation is currently stalled. See Randal C. Archibold, Judge Blocks Arizona's
Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010.
108. See Carrie Ritchie, Immigration Bill Signed Amid Arrests, INDP. STAR (May 11,
2011). See also Mary Beth Schneider, Delph Pitching New Bill on Illegal Immigration, INDP.
STAR (January 14, 2011),
http://www.indystar.com/article/20110114/NEWSO5/110114026/Delph-pitching-new-bill-
illegal-immigration.
109. Teresa Puente, Illinois Politician Proposes Anti-Immigrant Law Like Arizona's,
CHICAGO Now, Mar. 5, 2011, available at
http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/chicanisima/2011/03/illinois-politician-proposes-anti-
immigrant-law-like-arizonas.html.
110. Julia Preston, Political Battle on Illegal Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 31, 2010).
111. Id.
112. However, the Utah state legislature has raised the prospect of a state-level
guestworker program as an alternative to the punitive tenor of other state-level immigration-
related legislation. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Utah G.O.P. Adopts Immigration Alternative,
N.Y. TIMES (March 6, 2011). However, implementation of the legislation has been blocked.
Utah Immigration Law is Blocked, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011).
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5. Protection and Promotion of the Economy
In contrast to the constraints and limitations imposed on some human
beings-constraints and limitations whose impact limits those human be-
ings' legal personhood-in the pursuit of protection of the economic sys-
tem, attributes of personhood are increasingly recognized in and protected
on behalf of artificial entities. That is, the artificial entity becomes a juridi-
cal entity, which becomes a legal person; and courts find that those legal
persons are protected by a growing array of constitutional and other legal
rights.
In order to meet the ever-expanding need for capital, as well as to di-
versify the associated risks attendant to generating profit, capitalism has
developed various forms of collectivization or aggregation of identity. Such
developments have ancient roots.' 13 The juridical person, the corporation, is
understood primarily as a legal device which simplifies and stabilizes the
complicated web of contractual relationships that an association of share-
holders must enter into with a variety of outside parties. Its legal personality
endows the corporation with the legal capacity to interpose itself between
shareholders and outside parties and to enter into contracts with the latter on
behalf of the former.114
In the early history of the United States corporations were legal enti-
ties of little importance. States retained strict control over these legal per-
sons by closely supervising them and reserving the right to amend or repeal
their corporate charters at any time." 5 However, widespread distrust of the
entities changed with time and economic necessity." 6
113. See, e.g., Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583,
587-88 (1999):
For instance, excavations of private archives of a commercial settlement
at Kanes, a colonial town of the Old Assyrian state, brought to light the
extensive use of long-term partnership contracts, known as naruqqum, in
conducting the long-distance caravan trade as early as the 19th century
BC. The ancient Romans are also known to have set up a number of
partnership firms for their maritime trade. In fact, partnership forms of
business firms were all over the pre-modem commercial worlds-min the
East China Sea, along the Yellow River, along the Silk Roads, in the
South Sea, in the Indian Ocean, along the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers, and
in the Mediterranean Sea.
114. Id. at 587-88, 590.
115. Katie J. Thoennes, Comment, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of the Cor-
porate Power and Personhood in United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 203, 206-07 (2005).
116. According to Thoennes,
Despite any reservations during this period, many people saw the bene-
fits and need to create corporations. Originally, corporations were
charted exclusively to provide benefits to the public, such as building
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The United States Supreme Court's 1886 Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Rail Road Co.11 7 decision is one of the most significant
cases in the history of corporate America.: Since its issuance, the opinion
has influenced court decisions relating to corporations and their status as
"persons". According to Katie Thoennes, the case is known for the follow-
ing statement made by then-Chief Justice Waite prior to oral argument:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, ap-
plies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it
does."'
Following Santa Clara, the Court has broadly expanded the rights of
the corporate juridical person." 9 For example, the court broadened recogni-
tion and enforcement of constitutional protections for corporations, and
shielded the entities from some state statutes.
roads and bridges or digging canals. In return for providing public ser-
vices, states granted to corporations perpetual existence, limited liability,
and the right to own property. By forming corporations, people were
able to accomplish more than an individual could by acting alone be-
cause of the corporate structure and the ease with which capital could be
obtained. Corporations were seen as 'great engines for the promotion of
the public convenience, and for the development of public wealth.'
Id. (citations omitted).
117. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). However, the case has not been cited for its holding be-
cause the Court's opinion does not address or discuss the issue of whether corporations fall
under the classification of a "person" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thoennes,
supra note 115, at 209-10.
118. Id. at 209-210.
119. See id at 210-11. According to Thoennes:
Following the Santa Clara County decision, the United States Supreme
Court proceeded to strike down numerous state regulations as violations
of corporations' constitutional rights. The Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit state acts that deprive corporations of property
without due process of law, and that deny corporations the equal protec-
tion of the law. The Court also applied the Fifth Amendment to protect
corporations against double jeopardy and to require states to pay just
compensation for property taken from corporations; the Fourth Amend-
ment to protect corporations from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and the First Amendment to protect corporate freedom of speech, includ-
ing the right to make political contributions, the right to commercial
speech, and the right to be protected against compelled speech.
Id. (citing William Meyers, The Santa Clara Blues: Corporate Personhood versus Democ-
racy, III Publ'g, Nov. 13, 2000, at 5, at http://www.iiipublishing.com/afd/SantaClara.pdf).
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There is wide disagreement in the literature about the scope of rights
for corporations under domestic and international law. 120 However, the dis-
agreements take place against a firm consensus provided by the concept of
the juridical person and the protections afforded by that status.
C. EFFECTS: QUASI-PERSONHOOD
How and when does the manipulation of the concept of personhood
and/or the legal distinctions among "persons" pervert the society's stated
purposes, furthering and maintaining the exploitation, including enslave-
ment, of some by others? How and why is quasi-personhood constructed
within a legal system so as to normalize the exclusion of certain groups, and
to set the stage for their exploitation by others within and outside the socie-
ty?
Parts III(A) and III(B) above delineated the objectives and methodolo-
gies deployed by federal and state legal systems in efforts to further societal
purposes of protection and punishment. In their current forms, these poli-
cies and methodologies combine to strip individuals and groups of their
personhood-their ability to interact fully, from positions of equality, with-
in society, thus making them vulnerable to exploitation.
Exclusion from the definition of "person" leads to the creation of cate-
gories and strata of quasi-personhood. Where legal recognition and protec-
tion of personhood is withheld from targeted individuals and groups, the
opportunity for exploitation, including human trafficking, is increased. The
gap between legal recognition of personhood and biological human exis-
tence exists, for example, where immigrants (both legal and undocumented)
are not extended the human and civil rights of citizens of host states;121 and
120. See, e.g., William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large
Corporations: Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5. Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 128-133
(2004). See also Iwai, supra note 113, at 583-85.
121. According to Bridget Anderson and Julia O'Connell Davidson:
The factors that expose migrants to exploitation are linked to questions
about immigration/citizenship status, lack of access to support networks
and economic status. . . . Both internal and international migration can
create dependence on employers, whether they are private householders,
pimps, gangsters, entrepreneurs, or business operators. Regular migrants
may require employers to validate their immigration status, but when
they are undocumented they require their cooperation to not reveal their
status. In some sectors this may cause particular problems for the mi-
grant, for instance when the employer has the potential to exercise a high
degree of personal power over the worker either because the work is un-
regulated or even illegal, or because workers are isolated, or depend on
the employer for other needs such as accommodation, food, and so
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where ex-convicts are consigned to political death or internal exile by per-
manent disenfranchisement. 12 2
While immigration is an area of law traditionally regulated by the fed-
eral government and thus, subject to a presumption of preemption, state
legislation concerning areas of the law traditionally regulated by the states
is viewed as a valid exercise of a state's police powers. 12 3 Beginning in the
mid-1980s, federal immigration law has evolved from a stepchild of foreign
policy to a comprehensive legislative and regulatory scheme that intersects
the triumvirate of state power: criminal law, employment law, and wel-
fare.12 4 Specifically, because crime control is a centerpiece of state power,
closer ties between immigration and criminal law have a particularly strong
impact on the domestication of immigration law. 12 5 Therefore, it is argued
that the proliferation of general immigration legislation is well within the
police powers reserved to the states. This lends legitimacy to states passing
general immigration legislation under the guise of their ability to experi-
ment in social policymaking. In fact, every state in regular session consi-
dered laws related to immigrants or immigration in 2010.126 The key areas
of interest addressed in the general immigration legislation have been fairly
consistent over time, mostly focusing on areas such as budgets, education,
employment, health, human trafficking, law enforcement, and identifica-
tion/driver's licensing. 127
The interaction of multi-scalar federal and state constitutional, statuto-
ry, and regulatory provisions creates disabling multiplier and enhancement
effects on the personhood of targeted groups and individuals. For example,
it is possible to map the negative consequences for an individual of the as-
sertion of federal immigration statutes and regulations and federal anti-drug
trafficking housing laws with state and/or municipal restrictions on immi-
grants and ex-felons. The interaction of such effects could lead to internal
banishment and foreclosure of future paths of action that are sanctioned by
the law.
on.. . . Dependence is heightened by lack of access to support, and mi-
grants, internal and international, often do not have kin or friendship
networks to fall back on.
BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, Is TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
DEMAND DRIVEN? A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 44 (2003).
122. Mauer, supra note 72, at 51.
123. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension oflmmigration Fede-
ralism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 823 (2008) (arguing that the Constitution does not require
exclusive federal authority with respect to immigration).
124. Stumpf, supra note 106, at 1565.
125. Id. at 1587.
126. See Preston, supra note 110.
127. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 106.
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The mutation of historic forms of exploitation into analogous modem
forms may be masked with the help of the legal system. In the United
States, for example, it is possible to trace the evolution in legal construction
of quasi-personhood from slavery through Jim Crow laws through the dis-
enfranchisement of ex-felons and the dehumanization of immigrants. 12 8 The
quasi-personhood crafted in prior eras has mutated to subtler legal quasi-
personhood, which enshrine racial, economic, and other forms of subordi-
nation.
IV. QUASI-PERSONHOOD AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING
In its anti-human trafficking efforts, the United States has explicitly
recognized the vulnerability of some individuals and groups as a key con-
tributor to the risk of exploitation. For example, the Congressional Findings
preceding the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act included the follow-
ing acknowledgments about the sources of control utilized by traffickers
and vulnerability of illegal immigrants: "Traffickers often transport victims
from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations, including foreign
countries away from family and friends, religious institutions, and other
sources of protection and support, leaving the victims defenseless and vul-
nerable."1 29 The legislators also found that "Existing laws often fail to pro-
tect victims of trafficking, and because victims are often illegal immigrants
in the destination country, they are repeatedly punished more harshly than
the traffickers themselves."130 However, despite these acknowledgements,
and despite the protection, prevention, and prosecution purposes and poli-
cies expressed in the provisions of the TVPA, the internal domestic laws of
the United States continue to create vulnerabilities in targeted individuals
and groups, thus contributing to their exploitation.
According to commentator Anna Zalewski, "[t]he majority of traf-
ficked persons are migrant workers."1 31 Undocumented immigrants feel
increasingly at risk for removal and find their scope of activity and partici-
pation increasingly constrained. One undocumented immigrant located in
Arizona, who refuses to drive and leaves the home only to volunteer at her
128. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 7-9 (2008)
(describing the re-enslavement of blacks after Reconstruction through the mechanisms of the
criminal law and incarceration policies); and Weatherspoon, supra note 20 (arguing that
mass incarceration policies re-enslave African-American males). See also Johnson, supra
note 14, passim; HULL, supra note 74.
129. Trafficking Victims Prevention Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(5).
130. Trafficking Victims Prevention Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(17).
131. See Anna Zalewski, Note, Migrants for Sale: The International Failure to Ad-
dress Contemporary Human Trafficking, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 113, 121 (2005).
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children's elementary school, stated, "[y]ou can't walk alone because if you
are walking alone and you get taken, who is going to tell your family you
are gone?"1 3 2 Her perception is that that smuggled immigrants, such as her-
self, receive the same treatment as the perpetrators, thanks to an interpreta-
tion of Arizona's anti-smuggling statute in Maricopa County, Arizona, that
assigns the same level of responsibility to the criminals who smuggle
people into the country, known as "coyotes," and the people they sneak
across the border.'3 3
This is discouraging, since immigrant-related violence is on the rise,
according to Arizona's Department of Public Safety and Phoenix Police.1 34
At the same time, Immigration and Customs Enforcement acknowledges
that, "violence associated with human smuggling seems to be up . . . [w]e
get a lot of referrals from police departments in other places where the rela-
tives will get a call and the person will say, 'I'm in Phoenix. I'm being held
in a house and they told me if you don't pay $100,000 they will cut my ears
off or cut my fingers off."'l
3 5
In the domestic context, Professor Jennifer Chac6n identifies United
States immigration and labor laws as intricately involved in creating pre-
conditions that facilitate trafficking into the United States.136 The dire ef-
fects of such policies are plain, even (or especially?!) with respect to mi-
grant workers who enter the United States legally pursuant to programs that
have received the imprimatur of approval from the U.S. federal govern-
ment. As outlined in the Southern Poverty Law Center's 2007 report, the
laws and regulations that structure the program facilitate and even invite
exploitation that is close or identical to the restrictions on movement and/or
exit that is characteristic of human trafficking.13 7 Examples of the con-
132. Megan Irwin, Flushing Them Out: Joe Arpaio and Andrew Thomas are Teach-
ing the Rest of the Nation How to Terrorize Illegal Immigrants, PHOENIX NEW TIMEs, Dec.




135. Id. In Arizona, even U.S. citizens of Hispanic descent carry United States pass-
ports around to prove they are citizens. Id.
136. See generally Jennifer Chacon, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures
ofU.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2977 (2006).
137. This includes the confiscation of the workers' passports and other identity pa-
pers in order to control their mobility and eliminate their ability to escape the exploitative
conditions. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, at 15.
The Southern Poverty Law Center has received dozens of reports of this
practice and has, in the course of its legal representation of workers, con-
firmed that it is routine. While some employers state that they hold the
documents for the purpose of 'safekeeping,' many have been quite can-
did in explaining that there is a great risk that workers will flee if the
documents are not held. One employer sued by the Southern Poverty
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straints that facilitate the exploitation are the dependence on a single em-
ployer who possesses unfettered control over the future employability of
individual workers within the guest worker program, 38 as well as the limi-
tation on the migrant workers' ability to have recourse to law. 39
Sociologist Bridget Anderson also identified immigration laws as a
key source of vulnerability for trafficked individuals, describing the rela-
tionship between restrictive immigration laws and exploitability:
Law Center stated in her deposition that the company kept workers' So-
cial Security cards in the office because 'if they have their Social Securi-
ty card, they'll leave.'
Id. See also id at 16 ("The Southern Poverty Law Center also has encountered numerous
incidents where employers destroyed passports or visas in order to convert workers into
undocumented status.").
138. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, at 15.
The most fundamental problem with guestworker programs, both histor-
ically and currently, is that the employer - not the worker - decides
whether a worker can come to the United States and whether he can stay.
Because of this arrangement, the balance of power between employer
and worker is skewed so disproportionately in favor of the employer
that, for all practical purposes, the worker's rights are nullified. At any
moment, the employer can fire the worker, call the government and dec-
lare the worker to be "illegal."
Id.
139. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, at 8.
Though the H-2B program was created two decades ago by the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the DOL has never prom-
ulgated regulations enacting substantive labor protections for these
workers. IRCA, in fact, does not explicitly require such regulatory safe-
guards, providing only the guidance that the importation of H-2B work-
ers must not adversely affect U.S. workers' wages and working condi-
tions.
And, unlike the H-2A program, the procedures governing certification
for an H-2B visa were established not by regulation but rather by inter-
nal DOL memoranda (General Administrative Letter 1-95) and therefore
were not subject to the public comment and review process required
when new federal regulations are adopted. An employer need only state
the nature, wage and working conditions of the job and assure the DOL
that the wage and other terms meet prevailing conditions in the industry.
Because the H-2B wage requirement is set forth by administrative direc-
tive and not by regulation, the DOL takes the position that it lacks legal
authority to enforce the H-2B prevailing wage. While the employer is
obligated to offer full-time employment that pays at least the prevailing
wage rate, none of the other substantive regulatory protections of the H-
2A program apply to H-2B workers. There is no free housing. There is
no access to legal services. There is no "three-quarters guarantee." And
the H-2B regulations do not require an employer to pay the workers'
transportation to the United States.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
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It is particularly difficult for a person who is undocumented
to exercise her rights, because she may be deported if she
comes to the attention of the authorities. Rights given with
one hand are effectively taken away with the other. This is
most clearly revealed in the practice of dependent immigra-
tion status prevalent in the USA and Europe. While em-
ployers do not "own" their workers and cannot legally do
so, in the USA, for example, the visas given to domestic
workers require them to work only for the employers who
sponsor them. Effectively, then, the actual experience of the
worker may be similar to that of a slave. The "civilized"
state both limits and reinforces the power of the employers,
who may take advantage of this to the extent they choose.140
It is worth noting that laws targeting human trafficking have tripled in
2009 compared to 2008.141 Midwestern states such as Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, and Wisconsin closely mimic the federal legislation in terms of defin-
ing "human trafficking."l 42 Indiana has statutory protections in place for
victims, such as law enforcement training, restrictions on victim detention,
and administrative positions that provide assistance and services to vic-
tims. 14 3 The Illinois Department of Human Services also provides, subject
to availability, funds for emergency services and assistance to victims.'44
Iowa mandates law enforcement training and cultural sensitivity in the con-
text of human trafficking,14 5 and provides an interesting affirmative defense
to human trafficking offenders who commit violations under compulsion by
another's threat of imminent serious injury.146 Ohio takes an interesting
approach to defining "human trafficking" by providing that the offense
must be a scheme or plan involving at least two statutorily identified felony
offenses.147
However, despite the seemingly protective objectives underlying the
expansion of state anti-human trafficking legislation, the driving thrust of
140. BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK? THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
DOMESTIC LABOUR 138 (2000) (emphasis added).
141. See Preston, supra note 112. In addition, 2010 introduced a new area of immi-
gration concern, with three states, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee, enacting laws to help
prevent child abductions. Id.
142. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-3.5-1(a) (2011).
143. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-3.5-4(a) (2011).
144. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-9(h) (2011).
145. See IOWA CODE § 80B.11 (2010).
146. See IOWA CODE § 710A.3 (2010).
147. See ORC Ann. 2929.01(AAA) (2011). Rather than address the labor component
provided in the federal legislation, the Ohio definition highlights only sexual or obscene
offenses. Id.
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state-level immigration-related legislation focuses on disabling "the Oth-
er"-stripping certain human beings of personhood in order to protect the
nation state, the polity, the economy, from "the Other."l 4 8 The enactment of
anti-immigration statutes appears to implicate an anti-Latino and anti-
Hispanic sentiment, which blames aliens for social problems and will result
in further discrimination against and exploitation of an already margina-
lized group. State laws and local ordinances concerning immigration-
related issues victimize undocumented immigrants, who may in fact already
be victims of human trafficking.
Traffickers and corrupt officials use the quasi-personhood of their vic-
tims to assert control, to foster a psychological sense of helplessness and
dependence, and to bolster their claims of power over their victims. Too
often, those claims turn out to be true: The law itself enshrines the imbal-
ances in power through the imposition of quasi-personhood. In turn, the
victims' quasi-personhood status creates perverse disincentives. Under the
threat of deportation or other law enforcement penalty, the trafficked person
is less likely to seek out law enforcement or other sources of rescue. 149 At
the same time, law enforcement agencies are less likely to recognize the
victimization endured by those individuals or groups, seeing not victims in
need of assistance, but suspects who must be apprehended.'" The conse-
quent failure to intervene then serves to lengthen the period of such victims'
exploitation.
These contradictions exemplify the conflict between society's ideals,
obligations, and stated intent -- evidenced by federal and state anti-human
trafficking statutes and state and federal laws -- in a multiplicity of spheres
(such as anti-illegal immigration and post-incarceration punishment of con-
victed lawbreakers) as well asthe influence of that conflict on the actual
lived experiences of trafficked humans. The result is conflict, contradiction,
and subversion of both the United States' federal anti-trafficking legisla-
tion's stated goals of prevention, prosecution, and protection of trafficked
individuals and of the goals of the anti-human trafficking initiative of state
legislators.' 51
148. See discussion, Parts III.B.4 and 5 supra.
149. Haynes, supra note 3, at 252.
150. Id. at 366-367. See also Carrie Ritchie, 19 Arrested in Bust of Prostitution Ring,
THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 5, 2011, Al (describing federal law enforcement arrests in
connection with the interstate and international commercial sexual exploitation of women
"smuggled" from Mexico and countries in Central America). According to Ritchie's report:
"No evidence showed the women were held against their will, the authorities said."
151. Haynes, supra note 3, at 337-38, 380-81.
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V. CONCLUSION
The manipulation of the concept of personhood and the legal distinc-
tions among "persons" pervert the society's ideals, furthering and maintain-
ing the exploitation, including enslavement, of some by others. Quasi-
personhood is constructed within the legal system and deployed with the
resulting normalization of the exclusion of certain groups that sets the stage
for their exploitation by others within the society.
Rather than a protective rationale, the contradictions within the legal
system-its doctrines and rules-appear to manifest the intention of the
society to assert power and restrict the ability of subordinated and threaten-
ing groups or individuals to participate as equals. Further, the diminution in
the spheres of activity and legal rights of some human beings contrasts with
the expansion in the rights recognized in and enforced on behalf of artificial
legal persons.152
Constraints on personhood should be limited by the force and power of
the reality of humanity and the goal of equality. For example, Anna Za-
lewski calls for a fuller integration of the law enforcement provisions of the
Trafficking Protocol with the protections offered by the International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families (the "Migrant Convention").15 3 According to Zalewski, the
"wide range of economic, social, cultural and labor rights" offered by the
Migrant Convention, even to undocumented workers, and the obligations
undertaken by state parties to protect migrant workers and their families
offer a bulwark against the exploitation of trafficking.154 To address human
trafficking, we must deploy not just the rhetoric of equality, but the opera-
tion and implementation of policies and mechanisms that prevent vulnera-
bility to exploitation. 55 Full personhood of the individual must be unders-
tood as a right, not a privilege. At minimum, constraints on personhood
should be accompanied by detailed explanations (and understanding) of the
policy and other reasons for the limitations created and the ways in which
the drafters believe that those constraints will be implemented in real lives
in interaction with other legal disabilities and economic, cultural, and social
forces.
152. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), rejected its own longstanding precedent in order to uphold
the free speech rights of artificial business entities.
153. G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990). (The Migrant
Convention became effective on July 1, 2003).
154. See Zalewski, supra note 131, at 127-28. Note, however, that the United States
has neither signed nor ratified the Migrant Convention.
155. See Fiss, supra note 95 ("We ought not to subjugate [fellow human beings], not
because we owe them anything, but to preserve our society as a community of equals.").
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The lack of holistic analysis of multi-level, contradictory, and poten-
tially multiplicative statutes and regulations and their interaction with cul-
tural and social norms undermines the ability to respond to and to attack in
coherent form the multiple sources of the imposition of quasi- and non-
personhood and consequent vulnerability to exploitation.
